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A B S T R A C T
Proportional analogies between four objects (e.g., a squirrel is to tree as a golden fish is to? aquarium) were
examined in 30 schizophrenia patients and 30 healthy controls. Half of the problems included distracting re-
sponse options: remote semantic associates (fishing rod) and perceptually similar salient distractors (shark).
Although both patients and controls performed fairly accurately on the no-distraction analogies, patients’ per-
formance in the presence of distractors was distorted, suggesting deficits in attention and cognitive control
affecting complex cognition. Finally, although education, fluid intelligence, and interference resolution strongly
predicted distractibility in the control group, in the schizophrenia group susceptibility to distraction was un-
related to these markers of general cognitive ability, implying an idiosyncratic nature of reasoning distortions in
schizophrenia.
1. Introduction
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder traditionally primarily
related to positive and negative symptoms, such as hallucinations, de-
lusions, disorganised speech, bizarre behaviour, emotional flattening,
and social withdrawal. Nonetheless, cognitive deficits—which for dec-
ades have attracted relatively little attention as they are less pro-
nounced than psychotic symptoms—have in recent years attracted
considerable interest, being recognised as a central feature of schizo-
phrenia. Cognitive impairments are primaeval deficits in this mental
disorder and in many cases are present well before the onset of any
other symptoms (Bora et al., 2014; Davidson et al., 1999; Mohamed
et al., 1999). The most prevalent deficits include dysfunctions of at-
tention, executive function, language, verbal learning, and memory
(Bilder et al., 1992; Bowie and Harvey, 2006; Heinrichs and Zakzanis,
1998; Riley et al., 2000). Cognitive deficits are the best predictor of
functioning across a number of outcome domains and patient char-
acteristics (for reviews see Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000).
A frequently reported symptom experienced by patients suffering
from schizophrenia after admission consists of ineffective coping with
distraction (Freedman and Chapman, 1973), which reflects weakened
filtering of salient but irrelevant information (i.e., distractors) accom-
panied by deficits in focusing attention on task-relevant but not ne-
cessarily salient targets (see MacLeod, 1991). Ability to cope with
perceptual distraction is often measured with digit-span and word-span
tasks using a neutral and a distractor condition. In the neutral condi-
tion, subjects are asked to listen to a tape and repeat a list of digits or
words read by a female voice. In the distractor condition, a male voice
is also recorded between the target digits. Subjects are instructed to
ignore digits read by the male voice. Patients' performance on this task
is significantly hindered compared with that of healthy controls
(Addington et al., 1997; Green and Walker, 1986; Rund, 1989).
Addington et al. (1997) further investigated the relationship between
digit-span scores and schizophrenia symptoms and concluded that
performance remains stable over time regardless of changes in symp-
toms. This is in line with other data showing that cognitive deficits are
highly intra-individually stable over time (Harvey et al., 1990).
Furthermore, a comprehensive meta-analysis of the Stroop inter-
ference effect (i.e., naming an incongruent colour of a word meaning a
colour; e.g., ‘blue’ printed in red ink) in schizophrenia underlined
deficits in cognitive inhibition that partly explain impairments in ex-
ecutive functions in this mental disorder (Westerhausen et al., 2011). A
review including another two paradigms—negative priming and the
flankers—also confirmed inhibition abnormalities in schizophrenia in
the presence of distractors (Chieffi et al., 2015).
In addition, context processing—the mechanism responsible for
context representation and maintenance—is profoundly impaired in
schizophrenia (for a review see Barch and Braver, 2005). Context is
defined as “information that must be ‘actively’ held in mind in a form
that allows it to be used to mediate task appropriate behavior” (p. 124).
Context allows a task instruction to be applied that directs behaviour
towards achieving a solution (e.g., in the Stroop task the context is to
ignore the word and name the colour). Additional evidence on the re-
duced ability to use a context in schizophrenia is provided by extensive
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neuroimaging research using the N400 component, which is an in-
dicator of the degree to which a given stimulus (e.g., a current word) is
consistent and related to a preceding context (e.g., another word, the
whole sentence, or the entire discourse) (e.g., Condray et al., 1999;
Nestor et al., 1997; Niznikiewicz et al., 1997; Sitnikova et al., 2002).
However, it is not clear whether the proneness to distraction in
schizophrenia observed in all these relatively simple tasks also affects
complex cognitive processing such as reasoning and problem solving; in
these, top-down processing plays a crucial role, so the presence of
distractors in the environment may be less disruptive. Presumably, even
if the participant's attention is initially captured by a distractor, in the
case of more complex and longer lasting processes effective cognitive
control may lead the participant to revise his or her course of reasoning
back to the current goal and eventually to ignore the distractor.
However, since schizophrenia patients have deficits in context proces-
sing, it is also possible that they lack the ability to reject distractors that
are present in a complex task even if they have a substantial amount of
time in which to do so. Unfortunately, studies that have examined
whether and to what extent schizophrenia patients suffer from dis-
traction in reasoning and problem solving are scarce.
1.1. Distraction during analogy-making in schizophrenia
The present study focused on schizophrenia patients' performance
on one type of complex cognitive process: reasoning by analogy. Such
reasoning is prevalent in everyday life and acknowledged to underlie
productivity, compositionality, and flexibility in human thinking
(Hofstadter, 2001). To make a successful analogy one must identify the
structural correspondence between objects or situations that are inter-
related (see Gentner, 1983; Holyoak, 2012) and at the same time very
often ignore featural similarities (e.g., having the same parts or attri-
butes) or strong semantic associations between them (e.g., belonging to
the same category; Markman and Gentner, 1996). Should the latter
factors, rather than structural correspondence, drive the (in which case,
probably incorrect) analogy, then it is highly likely that the reasoner
will first become distracted by these irrelevant but usually enticing and
prepotent factors, and second, will fail to control their course of rea-
soning by performing a structural mapping of analogues (which, espe-
cially in remote analogies, share neither features nor semantics).
That semantic distractors may be especially challenging for schi-
zophrenia patients is suggested by research on such patients' distortions
of semantic processing and abnormal associations distribution (see
McCarley et al., 1999). For instance, Maher (1983) suggested that a
heightened effect of semantic priming may result in the associative
intrusion observed in the speech of schizophrenia patients. Presumably,
greater proneness to following automatically strong semantic associa-
tions may hinder the ability to avoid semantic distractors in the rea-
soning process.
Analogical tasks comprise highly familiar content and relations,
which makes them ecologically valid to a large extent. As such, they
seem better suited for research on clinical groups than do more artificial
and formal tasks such as logical inferences (e.g., Contreras et al., 2016;
Kemp et al., 1997) and probability judgments (e.g., Averbeck et al.,
2011; Freeman et al., 2014; Moritz and Woodward, 2005). There are
two main paradigms in studying reasoning by analogy: the four-term
analogy task and the scene analogy task.
In four-term (A:B::C:D) analogies (Alexander et al., 1987; Goranson,
2002; Goswami and Brown, 1990), a relation linking A and B must
apply to C and the to-be-found D. For example, in the analogy ‘squirrel is
to tree as golden fish is to?’, the relation is ‘typical habitat’ and the valid
conclusion is ‘aquarium’. The introduction of distractors into the re-
sponse bank in four-term analogies is common practice in studies of
analogical reasoning (see Holyoak, 2012). Usually, there are four pos-
sible answers: a correct one; one or two unrelated objects; and one or
two distractors (perceptual and/or semantic). This kind of design is
used to assess the effectiveness of reasoning by analogy in the presence
of distractors in various sub-fields, such as clinical research (e.g.,
Krawczyk et al., 2008, 2010) and developmental psychology (e.g.,
Glady et al., 2017; Goswami and Brown, 1990; Thibaut and French,
2016).
In the case of scene analogies, subjects are asked to indicate an
object in one scene that matches an object highlighted in another scene
(Richland et al., 2006). For instance, a dog chasing a cat chasing a
mouse in one scene would be mapped onto a woman chasing a boy
chasing a girl in another scene.
Despite the wide use of both paradigms in basic research, employing
analogical tasks in schizophrenia has been rare, even though such tasks
could substantially increase our knowledge of complex cognition in this
mental disorder. One exception is the study by Simpson and Done
(2004), who examined the solution transfer from a military attack
problem to a tumor radiation problem (Gick and Holyoak, 1983) and
reported that 17 of their schizophrenia patients missed the analogical
correspondence between the problems. In addition, Krawczyk et al.
(2014) found pronounced errors in drawing scene analogies in 13
schizophrenia patients; nevertheless, the patients' performance was still
very accurate (84.6% correct vs. 94.4% for healthy controls), even
though 12 out of the 24 scene analogies were relatively complex. This
latter study indicates that the natural framing of basic analogy tasks
means that they load only mildly on the cognitive system (even a
dysfunctional one) and are well suited to introducing targeted experi-
mental manipulations aimed at tracing specific cognitive deficits.
Specifically, one influential hypothesis claims that undeveloped (in
children) and distorted analogical reasoning (in normal ageing and
clinical subpopulations) is rooted in cognitive control dysfunctions
causing proneness to distraction (see Barkley, 1997; Goswami and
Brown, 1990; Krawczyk et al., 2010; Robin and Holyoak, 1995). For
instance, when mapping the chasing/chased cat scene onto a scene in
which a dog chased by a boy is chasing a cat, children below five years
of age usually incorrectly map the two cats together and the two dogs
together, demonstrating difficulty in inhibiting perceptual/semantic
similarity and using relational roles to map the dog onto the cat
(Richland et al., 2006). Similar deficits have been reported for frontal
lobe patients (e.g., Krawczyk et al., 2008; Morrison et al., 2004).
However, the only research that has examined distractors in an
analogical task in schizophrenia is the above-mentioned Krawczyk et al.
(2014) study. Here, distraction was introduced into half of the scene
analogy problems, so that either an object or an actor playing a role in
the key relation in one scene was also placed in the other scene. Un-
fortunately, a distracting object/actor was also placed outside the key
relation in the latter scene (sticking with the chasing/chased cat ex-
ample, the chased mouse from one scene was sitting and only observing
the boy chasing the dog chasing the cat in the other scene), so it may
have been largely ignored during the analogical reasoning process.
1.2. Distortions of complex cognition in schizophrenia and general cognitive
ability
There is ongoing debate on whether dysfunctions of complex cog-
nition in schizophrenia can or cannot be explained away simply in
terms of lower general cognitive ability (general and/or fluid in-
telligence; see McGrew, 2009). In this view, the disease is associated
with an overall decline in reasoning and problem-solving performance,
especially on novel abstract problems, as revealed by typical in-
telligence tests such as the Raven Progressive Matrices.
Research on both deductive and inductive reasoning tasks has
yielded inconclusive evidence: some reports have suggested that cog-
nitive dysfunctions are specific to schizophrenia and cannot be (fully)
attributed to patients' lower intelligence (see Crawford et al., 1993;
Martin et al., 2015; Niznikiewicz et al., 1997; Reichenberg and Harvey,
2007; Simpson et al., 1998; Sørensen et al., 2006; Wilk et al., 2005);
whereas other studies have found that accounting for intelligence re-
duces or even eliminates schizophrenia-related declines in performance
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(see Freeman et al., 2014; Jolley et al., 2014; Mirian et al., 2011).
However, to date no study has tackled this issue with regard to ana-
logical reasoning; specifically, whether distractibility is related to in-
telligence remains unknown.
1.3. Objectives of the study
Consequently, the present study applied a battery of four-term
analogy problems in neutral and distraction conditions to patients and
healthy controls in order to answer three key questions: (i) are patients
especially prone to distractibility during analogical reasoning?; (ii) are
they more vulnerable to distractors that match the targets both cate-
gorially and perceptually than to distractors associated only semanti-
cally?; and (iii) can individual differences in patients' distractibility be
explained by variance in general reasoning ability as well as executive
control ability, or do these differences instead reflect an idiosyncratic
deficit?
In light of the existing literature, we expected to observe a lower
ability to avoid semantic distractors as a result of impaired cognitive
inhibition and deficits in maintaining relevant context (in this case, the
analogy) to solve a problem. The relation between distractibility and
cognitive ability was an open question.
2. Method and materials
2.1. Four-term analogies
Each of 64 analogies had the aforementioned format A:B::C:D, in
which item D was absent. In the first 32 problems, the response option
set contained no distractors, while the remaining 32 problems had two
distractors among the possible responses. The salient distractor was an
object that belonged to the same semantic category as object C and was
also perceptually similar to it (e.g., a shark is an example of a salient
distractor for a fish as it belongs to the same semantic category and is
similar perceptually in terms of shape). The remote distractor was only
semantically associated with C; it did not resemble it perceptually (e.g.,
a fishing rod is an example of a remote distractor for a fish). Analogies
across the two 32-item sets were matched on number of living objects
and type of analogical relation between the source and the target. To
make the task less monotonous, analogies switched between pictorial
(items 1–16 and 33–48) and verbal (items 17–32 and 49–64) forms.
Fig. 1 presents a sample item.
The mean error rate for the no-distraction problems was low both
for the controls (1.5%) and for the patients (8.0%), matching Krawczyk
et al.'s (2014) findings. The majority of patients made no error (eight
people), or just one (six people), two (eight people), three (two people),
four (two people), or six (one person) errors. Only the remaining three
patients committed from eleven to fourteen errors. As many as 23
controls made no error, five made one error, one made two errors, and
only one person made eight errors. Thus, because of the pronounced
ceiling effects for both controls and patients, performance on the no-
distractor problems was not analysed further. However, to control
statistically for analogy-making performance in the neutral condition
(when the distractors were absent in the response options), which ap-
peared to be hindered in three patients and one control (i.e., 25% or
more errors), the dependent variable (distractibility) was defined as
individual performance on the analogy problems with options including
distraction minus performance on the problems with no distracting
option. The latter performance captured potential general cognitive,
social, affective, and medical factors unrelated to distractibility, so the
resulting variable was specific to the distraction itself present in the
response options. Specifically, distractibility was computed as the dif-
ference between the proportions of errors committed on problems with
and without distraction and showed how much individual performance
deteriorated when distractors were present in the response options.
Another variable, vulnerability to distractor salience, reflected the kind
of errors made regardless of actual performance level. It was defined as
the ratio of salient distractors selected by a participant to the sum of
both salient and remote distractors selected, reflecting how prone the
participant was to picking the salient distractors.
2.2. Reasoning ability
This task involved 18 selected problems from the above-mentioned
hallmark test of fluid intelligence—i.e., Raven's Standard Progressive
Matrices (hereafter referred to as the Raven). Each problem was a visual
geometric pattern with one cell missing. Participants were asked to
choose one out of six or eight response options (depending on the
problem) so that it filled the missing cell according to the hidden rule(s)
governing the pattern. The score was the proportion of incorrectly
solved problems (Raven errors).
2.3. Interference resolution
This task involved two parts. The word-reading part consisted of
reading aloud as quickly as possible 50 words, each describing a colour,
that were printed in black on one A4 page (5 words per row). The
colour-naming part involved naming as quickly as possible the colour in
which another 50 words were printed; these words were presented in
the same layout but this time their meaning (the colour name) was
incongruent with their ink colour (e.g., the word ‘red’ was printed in
green). All the words were in Polish—the native language of all the
participants. The dependent variable (Stroop interference) was the dif-
ference between the time taken to name the colours and the time taken
to read the words (subtraction controlled for differences in processing
speed).
2.4. Participants
The experiment involved 34 healthy controls as well as 30 inpatient
individuals who met the ICD-10 criteria for schizophrenia. The patients'
condition was examined by a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist,
according to whom the patients showed neither signs of delusion at the
time of the experiment nor any profound thought disorder that would
impede communication or task comprehension. All the patients were
being medicated with second-generation antipsychotics. At the time of
participating, they had spent six to eight weeks on the ward since being
admitted to hospital. Their condition was assessed as stable. Controls
were drawn from non-psychiatric patients and from the general popu-
lation via word of mouth. All the participants were informed about the
right to stop the experiment at any time at will. All provided informed
consent to participate. The entire procedure was approved by the local
Ethics Committee. The data of two controls were missing, while that of
two others who had gone the furthest in their education were excluded
to achieve a better match between the groups.
Overall, there were 13 female and 17 male patients and 19 female
and 11 male healthy controls, making this the largest sample to date in
research on distraction during reasoning by analogy in schizophrenia.
The mean time that had elapsed from the patients' schizophrenia di-
agnosis was M = 10.0 years (SD = 8.1, range 1–31). Age did not dif-
ferentiate the patients (M = 35.3 years, SD = 9.9, 24–55) from the
controls (M = 35.3 years, SD = 7.7, 21–51), t(58) = 0.03. Education
slightly but not critically differed between the patients
(M = 13.3 years, SD = 2.7, 8–17) and the controls (M = 15.2 years,
SD = 2.6, 11–18), t(58) = 2.74. The patients were less accurate on the
Raven (M = 34.4% errors, SD = 17.3%, 5.5–72.2%) than were the
controls (M = 11.5% errors, SD = 11.7, 0–38.9%), t(58) = 6.07. The
patients also took more time to name the colours (M = 45.4 s,
SD = 19.8 s, 21–118 s), compared with the controls (M = 28.9 s,
SD = 10.0 s, 10–45 s), t(58) = 4.27.
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2.5. Procedure
All materials used in this study, except for the ‘colour-naming’ task,
were printed in black ink on a white A4 sheet of paper. Each task was
preceded by written instructions. The researcher provided additional
verbal help where necessary. To make the reasoning by analogy task
clear, the rules were explained to all the participants using an ex-
emplary exercise. Next, the participants attempted to solve a training
problem by themselves. The same training was used with the Raven.
Participants indicated their response by saying its letter/number index
aloud. If they selected the correct response, the experiment com-
menced. Otherwise, the experimenter repeated the instructions,
pointing to the right response, and only then proceeded to the experi-
ment. The entire session lasted about 30 min.
2.6. Data treatment and analysis
No data cells were missing. Bayes Factor (BF) was used to test dif-
ferences in means between the patients and the controls. BF assessed
the ratio of posterior likelihood in favour of the hypothesis that the
patients' performance would be worse than that of the controls, given
the evidence. Although BF implicates no fixed ‘significance level’,
typically BF values exceeding 3.0/10.0 suggest reliable/strong evidence
in favour of the hypothesis being tested, those below 0.33/0.10 re-
liably/strongly suggest no effect, and those in between are considered
to be inconclusive (Kass and Raftery, 1995). As larger values of de-
mographic variables (age, distractibility, years of education – reversed)
indicated worse outcomes, positive correlations among the variables
were expected. All calculations were carried out in JASP software (jasp-
stats.org). In line with the scarcity of existing evidence, the default
value of prior parameter was adopted, assuming the equal, a priori
likelihood of both hypotheses tested.
3. Results
Table 1 presents the error rates and standard deviations for all four
conditions of the four-term analogy task, separately for the schizo-
phrenia patients and the control group.
3.1. Distractibility
Fig. 2a presents the distribution of the distractibility index for each
group. The patients' mean distractibility (M = 25.1% errors,
SD = 15.2%, range 0–62.0%) was significantly higher than the mean
Fig. 1. An example four-term analogy. Response options include: A (an aquarium) - the correct response, B (a rose) - an unrelated object, C (a fishing rod) - a remote
distractor related semantically, D (a shark) - a salient distractor belonging to the same semantic category and perceptually similar.
Table 1
Error rates (and standard deviations) for the four conditions of the four-term analogy task.
Pictorial without distraction Verbal without distraction Pictorial with distraction Verbal with distraction
Patients 8.3% (11.7) 8.1% (13.4) 35.8% (18.5) 31.6% (19.6)
Controls 1.2% (4.7) 1.9% (4.9) 14.3% (20.4) 7.8% (14.2)
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distractibility of the controls (M = 9.4% errors, SD = 14.3%, 0–50%),
BF10 = 360.9, Cohen's d = 1.08.
In order to exclude the possibility that the distractibility effect was
somehow affected by participants who generally performed poorly on
the task, in an additional step the three patients and the one control
who did not meet the<25% errors criterion on the trials without
distraction were excluded from the analysis. The effect was barely af-
fected by excluding these outliers, with the patients (M= 26.4% errors)
still much more distractible than the controls (M = 9.1% errors),
BF10 = 336.6, Cohen's d = 1.09.
3.2. Vulnerability
Fig. 2b presents each groups' distributions of the index of
vulnerability to distractor salience. Values were available for 18 con-
trols only, because 12 controls scored null distractibility (see Fig. 2a).
Mean vulnerability was comparable between the patients (M = 36.5%
salient errors, SD = 19.7%, 0–72.0%) and the controls (M = 34.9%
salient errors, SD = 33.3%, 0–100%), BF10 = 0.300, d = 0.06. Again,
the analysis excluding the four outlying participants yielded virtually
the same outcome (M = 35.6% vs. M = 32.0% salient errors for pa-
tients and controls respectively) BF10 = 0.331, d = 0.08.
3.3. Correlations
Table 2 presents the matrix of Pearson correlations, separately for
each group. Four patterns of results emerged. First, in the patients,
education (reversed), Stroop interference, and vulnerability were
Fig. 2. (a) The distributions of distractibility index (the difference in error rate between the analogies with and without distraction) for the groups of 30 controls vs.
30 patients of schizophrenia. (b) The respective distributions of index of vulnerability to salient distractors (the proportion of error options matching both se-
mantically and perceptually, in all error made). Note that the latter index was computed for only the 18 controls who made at least one error (all the 30 patients made
errors).
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significantly predicted by the time that had elapsed since their schi-
zophrenia diagnosis (e.g., it accounted for 20.2% of the variance in
interference). Second, the variables relating to general cognitive abil-
ity—i.e., age, education (reversed), Raven errors, and Stroop inter-
ference—were more closely mutually correlated in the controls, as in-
dicated by their visibly higher loadings on the principal component
(0.776, 0.893, 0.860, 0.745, 67.4% of the variance explained by the
component), than in the patients (0.530, 0.721, 0.767, 0.698, 46.9% of
the variance explained); suggesting, as predicted, a certain amount of
distortion in the structure of cognitive abilities in the patients (see
Martin et al., 2015). Third, the controls' distractibility was significantly
correlated with age, education (reversed), Raven errors, and Stroop
interference; furthermore, all these correlations were actually driven by
Raven errors, which explained 68.9% of the variance in distractibility
(and was its only significant predictor in the regression model). In
contrast, none of these variables significantly predicted distractibility in
the patients (e.g., Raven errors explained as little as 4.8% variance).
Tested formally using a permutation test, the amount of variance in
distractibility explained by the Raven in the controls was significantly
larger than the corresponding amount explained by the Raven in the
patients, Δr = 0.612, p = .0004, one-tailed. Fourth, exactly the reverse
pattern could be observed for vulnerability: 18.5% of its variance was
significantly predicted by the Raven errors made by the patients,
whereas it accounted for null variance in the controls. Possibly because
of the low number of vulnerability values for the controls, the
Δr = 0.468 difference only tended to significance according to the
permutation test, p = .059, one-tailed. Fig. 3 illustrates the relation-
ships between the Raven errors and distractibility and vulnerability in
the two groups.
4. Discussion
Thirty patients displayed substantially greater distractibility during
analogical reasoning than did the thirty controls, more frequently se-
lecting incorrect options which contained either a salient (a percep-
tually similar object from the same category as the to-be-matched
analogue) or a remote (a perceptually different but semantically related
object) distractor. At the same time, both groups scored high on ana-
logies that did not contain distractors, suggesting that selecting the
relationally matching target was quite easy when invalid options were
unrelated to the to-be-matched analogue. However, despite the former's
greater proneness to distraction, the patients and the controls were si-
milarly largely invulnerable to salient distractors, with both groups
selecting twice as many remote distractors (relatively more ‘reasonable’
errors to make) as salient ones. Finally, the pattern of correlations re-
vealed different origins of the distractibility in the two groups. General
cognitive ability was a direct predictor of the controls' distractibility,
with over two-thirds of its variance explained by performance on the
Raven test. In contrast, the patients' higher distractibility was not re-
lated to any variable, not even to the length of time since they had been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, suggesting the idiosyncratic nature of
their distractibility. The pattern for vulnerability was reversed: it cov-
aried with cognitive functioning only in the patients. However, the lack
of correlation in the control group could have been affected by the
relatively low number of people (Freeman et al., 2014) who made er-
rors in analogies as well as by the overall low number of errors com-
mitted (106). Summing up, two patterns of correlations seem statisti-
cally meaningful: (i) the Raven errors, age, education (reversed), and
interference predicted distractibility in the controls but not in the pa-
tients, (ii) however, for the patients these measures nicely predicted
vulnerability.
The present results suggest that higher distractibility in schizo-
phrenia patients negatively affects their complex cognition in the pre-
sence of semantically associated objects. A stronger distractibility in
analogical reasoning on semantic material in schizophrenia may arise
through two dysfunctional mechanisms. First, susceptibility to intru-
sions caused by semantic associations may increase the probability that
a distractor rapidly attracts attention before that attention can be di-
rected at the target (and so it is not). This mechanism could pertain to
bottom-up processing resulting in distorted problem representation af-
fecting the course of reasoning. The second mechanism taps more
complex processing. Specifically, dysfunction in context processing in
schizophrenia leads to an inability to validate conclusions that are in-
compatible with the current goal and the relevant context (Barch and
Braver, 2005; Barch et al., 2001). In the case of four-term analogies, the
context is not complete until the relation between A and B is con-
sidered. Schizophrenic patients may be prone to basing their responses
solely on the option's semantic relationship to the C term, ignoring the
context. It is worth mentioning that there was no time pressure in the
reasoning task, so the opportunity for participants to correct their
course of reasoning was not restricted. According to the model pro-
posed by Barch and Braver (2005) and based on numerous prior studies
(Barch et al., 2001; Braver et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999),
deficits of context processing—a component of more general deficits in
cognitive control—underlie disrupted performance on a broad array of
task domains. Disturbances in the dopaminergic mechanisms in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex play a central role in this model. Lesh
et al.'s (2011) model explaining impaired higher cognition in schizo-
phrenia also assumes that deficits in cognitive control resulting from
dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex play a central role.
That both groups were generally not vulnerable to salient dis-
tractors, and that vulnerability covaried with general cognitive ability
only in the case of schizophrenia patients, is very informative. It sup-
ports the idea that distractibility during analogical reasoning is rooted
in more bottom-up mechanisms of susceptibility to improper semantic
associations, and that the primary criterion for a stimulus to be a dis-
tractor is to share semantics with the target. In contrast, the in-
correctness of sheer perceptual similarity is obvious and can be rela-
tively easily rejected. Thus, actual distractibility depends upon
semantic associations, reflecting abnormalities in the semantic network.
The fact that vulnerability was greater only in patients with low general
cognitive ability may suggest that only very profound cognitive dis-
order leads to substantial susceptibility to perceptual similarity.
A crucial result concerns the null correlations between distract-
ibility and other variables in schizophrenia where significant correla-
tions were observed for the healthy controls. Effective reasoning relies
on the coordinated functioning of several brain regions (Krawczyk
et al., 2008). In light of the heterogeneity of cognitive deficits (Joyce
and Roiser, 2007) and the structural brain abnormalities in schizo-
phrenia (e.g., Glahn et al., 2008; Harrison, 1999), it is unlikely that
distorted reasoning by analogy could be explained entirely by a single
factor, such as general intelligence. In contrast, null correlations be-
tween the variables suggest substantial disintegration of the structure of
cognitive abilities. These findings also accord with data showing that
fluid intelligence does not explain impaired performance on a broad
battery of executive function tests (Martin et al., 2015).
Table 2
The matrix of Pearson correlations between all variables examined in the study.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Age – 0.586 0.513 0.470 0.406 −0.251
2. Education (reversed) −0.043 – 0.773 0.530 0.654 0.271
3. Raven errors 0.284 0.475 – 0.494 0.831 −0.035
4. Stroop interference 0.308 0.350 0.256 – 0.476 0.250
5. Distractibility 0.210 0.116 0.219 0.268 – −0.103
6. Vulnerability 0.332 0.345 0.433 −0.019 0.193 –
7. Years from diagnosis 0.610 0.397 0.271 0.446 0.268 0.373
Note. Data for the control group above the diagonal, data for the schizophrenia
patients below the diagonal. N = 30 for each group, except for the vulnerability
index in the control group (N = 18). Correlations with BF surpassing 2.0
marked with bold font.
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Finally, no relationship was found between distractibility and the
length of time patients had been diagnosed as having schizophrenia, in
accordance with Zipursky et al.'s (2013) findings contesting the idea of
progressive deterioration of cognitive functioning during the course of
the illness. Mohamed et al. (1999) also concluded that cognitive deficits
are intrinsic and do not depend on institutionalisation history or illness
duration.
Fig. 3. (a) Scatterplots presenting the significantly different relationship between the number of errors committed in Raven's SPM test and the distractibility index
(increase in error rate under distraction presence) in the schizophrenia patients vs. the healthy control group. (b) Analogical, but opposite, difference in relationship
between the two groups for the vulnerability index (proportion of salient distractors in all error options selected). Black solid line indicates the regression line, dashed
lines reflect the 95% confidence belts.
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5. Conclusion
The current study provides new insights into the nature of dis-
tractibility affecting complex cognition in schizophrenia. It underscores
the highly negative impact of distractors on patients' analogical rea-
soning and points to the disintegration of their structure of cognitive
abilities. Null links with other cognitive functions indicate that dis-
tractibility is a specific disorder that should be assessed regardless of
other dysfunctions in order to diagnose validly the cognitive condition
of patients suffering from schizophrenia. The present results support the
view that cognitive dysfunctions in schizophrenia are serious and
complex.
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